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Slade  examines  the efficiency  and equity  of a  The market failures  associated  witii com-
market allocation  of exhaustible  resources  and  mon-property  and environmental  resources  can
assesses the behavior  of scarcity  measures,  such  cause  market  prices to be lower than shadow
as relative  price and rental rates. She finds little  prices  or marginal  values.  They cannot,  however,
evidence  of scarcity  or impending  shortage.  cause relative  resource  prices to fall, Slade
Indeed,  the evidence  points to falling  prices and  argues.  Faling prices would  be associated  with a
rents for many commodities.  relaxation  of environmental  standards  and a
move  away from full-social-cost  pricing.  The
Do markets  send the wrong  signals?  Are  tendency,  however,  is toward  increased  aware-
resource  commodities  systematically  ness  of environmental  damage  and increased
underpriced?  Her conclusions  are not completely  willingness  to pay for its associated  costs.
optimistic.
Nevertheless,  the prices  of many nEtural-
Slade's analysis  reveals  many  market  resource  commodities  have fallen in real terns.
failures,  any of which would  result in inappropri-  Factors  causing  prices  to decrease  are not
ate resource  commodity  pricing. But, with one  associated  with market failure, and therefore  do
exception,  she finds no systematic  tendency  to  not support  interference  with the market  mecha-
underprice.  The exception  concerns  the environ-  nism. Indeed,  says Slade,  innovations  that lower
mental  externalities  associated  with the produc-  mining  and processing  costs, discoveries  that
tion and use of natural-resource  commodities.  increase  resource  stocks,  and the provision  of
Similar externalities  lead to underpricing  and  lower-cost  substitutes  are all features  of effi-
overuse of all commodities.  Mineral  commodi-  ciently  operating  markets.
ties, however,  are responsible  for a large fraction
of the pollution  that is currently  generated,  so
their underpricing  is particularly  significant.
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Prices are the vehicle through which markets allocate goods and services.  Under an
idealized set of assumptions, the competitive-price  mechanism results in  a  Pareto optimal
allocation of resources.  Economists, however, are concerned about the ability of the price
system to  allocate resources in  a  near-optimal fashion when the assumptions required for
optimality  are only approximately  met. In what follows, some  of the salient  issues of this debate
are examined  with reference to exhaustible-resource  markets. Can such markets be counted on
to allocate non-renewable  resources in an efficient and equitable  fashion?
Non-renewable  or mineral  resources are unique  because,  unlike the pote!%tially  unlimited
supply of labor and man-made capital, their stock is  finite.  They constitute the principal
potential limit to economic  growth.  For centuries, economists  and political philosophers  have
been concerned about resource availability  and the capacity of the market mechanism  to price
scarcity.  While some have been pessimistic about the  market's ability to  deal with  the
constraints imposed  by finite  resource stocks, others have taken more optimistic  positions. The
debate is by no means closed and many unso'ved problems rernvin-  For this reason, while
theoretical  models  are discussed  and empirical  evidence  bearing  on the subject  is marshalled,  this
paper provides  no definitive  answers. Many of its conclusions  are far from universally  accepted.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section II develops a model of a competitive
market for an exhaustible  resource and demonstrates  that, in this model, the price mechanisn
allocates the resource in a Pareto-optimal  fashion.  In other words, the market is shown to be
efficient. Section III then asks whether this competitive-market  allocation is equitable.  The
notion of equity clearly depends on a social-welfare  function, and several well-known  welfare
criteria are discussed in this regard.  Section IV examines evidence.  SLArcity  measures and
natural resource price paths are addressed.  Generally, the evidence is found to be negative:
overall price behavior is inconsistent  with the predictions  of the simple model, while there is no
evidence that we are "running  out" of natural resources.
The simple  model  is then examined,  the realism of its assumptions  assessed, and possible
market failures explored. Uncertainty is introduced.  Section V questions the existence of
markets for all commodities, for all states of the world and all future time periods.  It also
explores the implications  of incomplete  markets for Pareto optimality  in the allocation  of both
commodities  and risk.
In Section VI, possible  market failures are assessed.  The notion of shadow prices is
introduced  and the circumstances under which shadow and market prices can be expected to
diverge  are identified. These latter include  the existence  of monopoly  power in resource markets
(which causes a divergence between  output prices and marginal output values), the presence of
unemployment  (which causes a divergence between wages and marginal input values), and an
inappropriate  choice of currency values (which causes  a divergence  between exchange  rates and
marginal-foreign-exchange  values).
Finally, common-property  and environmental  problems  are introduced. These problems
and their associated  market failures are not unique to mineral industries. Nevertheless, mining
and refining, in  the absence of  controls, are heavily polluting activities.  The situation is
exacerbated by the transnational nature of the spillovers, which makes agreements to  limit
pollution difficult to enforce.
1Clearly, in assessing the price system, it is inadequate merely to conclude that markets
are  not ideal and market failures exist.  What is required is a comparison of the  market
allocation to its feasible  alternatives. If governments  are to put forward policies that constrain
resource production,  consumption,  or pricing, they  should  confront the problems  associated  with
alternative institutions and enforcement mechanisms.  In  this paper,  these issues are  only
mentioned  in passing.  They are, however, considered in greater detail in a companion paper
(Slade 1991a).
II. Intergenerational  Efficiency
In this section, a  model is constructed in order to address the question of efficient
resource allocation  formally.'  The notion of Pareto optimality  is introduced  and conditions for
an efficient program are derived.  The competitive-market  outcome is then compared to the
efficient program.
The standard analysis of the efficiency  of competitive  markets is static.  Static analysis
is adequate  because  there is nothing  that links consumption  in different  periods. However, when
an exhaustible  resource is introduced, the problem becomes  dynamic  and the standard analysis
no longer applies. Consequently,  this study  develops  a dynamic  model  of intertemporal  resource
allocation. We begin with an economy  with a single consumption  good, C.  Consumers  derive
utility from its consumption,  and the marginal utility of consumption  is assumed to be strictly
positive. An allocation is thus assumed to be intergenerationally  efficient (equivalently,  Pareto
optimal), if it is impossible  to increase consumption  in one period, t, without  causing less to be
consumed  in some other period, t'.
We now introduce a homogeneous  exhaustible  resource.  Resource  flows and stocks in
period t are denoted R, and St, respectively,  and the initial stock is assumed to be finite.  In the
simplest case,  where  C,=R,  and  the entire  stock is eventually consumed,  all allocations  are
efficient.  An increase in consumption in period t must be exactly offset by a decrease in some
other period t'.  This simple  example serves to illustrate  two points: first, the notion of Pareto
efficiency is fairly weak; and second, radically different programs can be similarly efficient.
To make the notion of efficiency non-trivial, we must recognize that most minerals are not
consumed directly.  Instead,  they are  used  as  inputs to  the production of  final goods.
Furthermore, when production relies on  more than one input,  intergenerational efficiency
constrains relative input use.  In what follows, this more realistic probiem is analysed.
The economy  is now modified  to include  aggregate  output, Q, which is produced  by two
inputs, man-made  capital, K, and an exhaustible  resource, R.  This relationship  is governed  by
the production function
Qt =  f(K,Rts,t)  (1)
A similar model can be found in Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
2where  f is assumed  to be increasing,  concave,  and twice  continuously  differentiable  in K and R,
and the marginal  products  of K and R are assumed  to be strictly  positive. The presence  of t in
the production  function  reflects  the possibility  of technical  progress.
Output  can b- eonsumed  (C) or invested  (I) so that
Q, = Ct + It  (2)
and
It =  dK!dt =:kt  (3)
At any time t, therefore,  the stock  remaining  is
S= = So- JiRtdA  (4)
so that S, =  - Rt and St 2  0.
An evolution of this economy {K,, So,  R,  Cj}o is intertemporally inefficient if th're
exists another feasible  program {w  , St,  ft, Ct}O with 1  2  Cq  for al  t and Z  >  Ct for some
t.  If such a program does not exist, then the original  program is intertemporally  efficient. With
an efficient  program,  therefore,  it is impnssible  to increase  consumption  in one period  without
decreasing  it in another. In general,  thL  -c can be an infinite  number  of efficient  programs.
The assumption  that the marginal  product  of R is strictly  positive  implies  that, with an
efficient  program,  the entire  stock  will eventually  be used  up.  In other words
lim  St = 0  (5)
t-*Goo
This condition,  however,  is no longer  sufficient.
To compare  competitive  and efficient  market  allocations,  we now  derive  conditions  that
each  must  satisfy  in order to determine  whether  they  are the same. The attached  annex  (pp  24-
26) explores  the implications  of intergenerational  efficiency  formally. The necessary  condition
derived  there is: 2
f.=  fr  (6)
To interpret  equation  (6), suppose  that input  and output  markets  are competitive  and let
Q be the numeraire  good.  Then fKt  is the rental rate of capital  which, since it does not
depreciate,  is also the rate of return.  to holding  K, which  we denote  r.  Moreover,  f  is the spot
price of the resource,  which  we denote  P,, and  fRVfRt  is the rate of resource-price  appreciation.
2  A  subscripted function denotes  the partial derivative of that  function with respect  to  the
argument that corresponds to the subscript.
3Equation (6) is thus seen to be the familiar Hoteiling (1931)  rule that, in a competitive  market,
the resource price appreciates  at the rate of interest: 3
P,P, = r  (7)
Equation (7) is a local condition and, by itself, does not guarantee efficiency.  This
should  be obvious since it only determinies  the rate of change  in price, not the price level itself.
With many technologies  (production  functions f), however, the combination of (7) and (5) is
sufficient for efficiency; competitive  markets allocate an exhaustible resource in an efficient
manner and no government intervention is required.  The intergenerational  or intertemporal
efficiency of competitive-resource  markets is a very strong result and one that calls for more
careful analysis.  First, however, we turn to the question of equity.
Im.  Intergenerational  eguity
As noted above, competitive  markets, under idealized circumstances, will allocate a
scarce resource in  an efficient manner.  However, this does not imply the optimality of
competitive  markets.  Intergenerational,  like cross-sectional  optimality requires some balance
between intertemporal  efficiency  and equity.  Again. standard (static) analyses of equity do not
apply to exhaustible-resource  markets; consequently,  equity must be examined  witiin a dynamic
setting.
Since equity is  defined with respect to  some social-welfare function, it cannot be
discussed without maling  a value judgement of some kind.  A cross-sectional  social-welfare
function, for instance, weights the utilities of different consumers or households.  However,
since the focus here is on aggregate consumption,  cross-sectional  problems are ignored. 4 An
intertemporal  social-welfare  function,  by contrast, weights  the utilities of different generations.
The choice of generational weights  is, of course, significant. There are t,iany welfare criteria
common  in the literature, each involving  different welfare weights.  For example, the sum of
generational  utilities can be maximized  (the utilitarian  criterion) or the minimum  utility can be
maximized  (the maximin  criterion). With the former, each generation  is given equal weight,  and
with the latter, the highest sustainable  consumption  level is sought. 5 For either criterion, there
is the further choice of whether or not to discount the utility of future generations.  At first
glance, discounting  may seem like an unfair practice. Why should earlier generations  be given
3  More generally,  with positive extraction costs, it is the net marginal  product of R, P - MC, that
appreciates at the rate of interest.
'  The mere fact that only aggregate consumption, C,, is analyzed, however, means that we are
implicitly  assuming  a cross-sectional social-welfare  function of a particularly simple sort. Indeed, we
are maximizing  the sum of individual consumption in each period, which is equivalent to using a
utilitarian criterion with the utility of consumption equal to consumption itself.
5  It is initially  assumed that the utility of consumption is consumption itself.
4higher welfare  weights  than later? On closer consideration,  however, tiere may be valid welfare
grounds for discounting.
Suppose  that there is some positive probability  Pt,  that the world as we know it will end
in period t.  Collapse might be due to a sudden climatic change -- a new ice age, for example
-- or to a man-made  disaster, such as war.  In either case, the aim is to maximize the expected
value of the relevant welfare criterion.  With a utilitarian  criterion, for example, the expected
value is:
co00
E[X  Ct] =  [rI(1  -p]ct
t=o  (8)
In the special case where Pt = p for all t, (8) reduces to
E[  Ct]  = 7(  p)t  Ct.
t=o  t=O  ()
Equation (9) looks very much like a discounted consumption  stream.  The discount factor
1-p ,  however, has  a  different interpretation.  Instead of valuing the utilities of  future
generations  less, their utilities are weighted  by the probability  that they will be around to enjoy
their consumption.
In addition, when the utility of consumption in period t is not equated with C,, it is
reasonable to  assume that  the  marginal utility  of  C  diminishes with  C.  Under these
circumstances,  Lilere  is a second reason for discounting  the consumption  of future generations.
If per-capita income rises over time, as has been the case historically, then future generations
will derive less and less utility from the same level of consumption. This gives rise to a utility
discount factor in addition to an uncertainty  discount factor.
Different  welfare criteria clearly result in different  patterns of resource extraction. For
example, it should be intuitively  obvious that the maximin  criterion results in a constant level
of consumption  for every period. 6 Constant consumption  can be contrasted  with the standard
rising-price  falling-consumption  pattern produced  by competitive  markets. A utilitarian  criterion
gives rise to still another consumption  path.
The choice of social-welfare  function  is a complex  issue that is beyond the scope  of this
paper.  However, it is to be hoped that the discussion above makes clear the basic mistake
involved in  .-  iating  efficiency with  optimality.  Moreover, even  though the  idealized
6  For a formal  demonstration  of this claim,  see Solow  (1974). This  program  can be implemented
using  the "Hartwick  Rule" (1977),  which  states  that a constant  level  of consumption  can be achieved
by investing  all  of the rents from  the extraction  of exhaustible  resources  under  competitive  conditions.
5competitive  market  allocates resources  efficiently,  there is no evidence that it does so equitably.
IV.  Evidence from Natural-Resource Markets
We now turn from theory to evidence, in order to assess whether real-world markets
give appropriate signals of resource scarcity and whether the necessary conditions for
efficient-resource  allocation are met in practice.  Three common  scarcity indicators are
defined, their strengths and weaknesses  discussed, and their historic behavior analyzed.
Evidence  from econometric testing of the Hotelling model is then examined.
1.  Measuling Scarcity
As a resource becomes scarce, it is hoped that the market will signal this fact and that
consumers  will adapt their usage patterns accordingly. Several indices that might signal
scarcity have been proposed in the literature.  The most popular of these are relative price
(the ratio of an extractive-industry  price index to an overall price index), unit cost (the value
of factor inputs per unit of extractive-industry  output), and rental rate (the ma-ginal value of
the unextracted  resource).
Unit cost is the least appealing  of the three measures. For example, in Hotelling's
classic article (1931) the resource is assumed to be extracted  costlessly.  Under these
circumstances,  unit cost can provide no signal of increasing scarcity.  Nevertheless,  price
rises at the rate of interest and causes consumers to conserve on use.  Whether relative price
or rental rate is a better measure of scarcity is much debated (see Brown and Field, 1978;
Smith, 1978; and Fisher, 1979). With the simplest competitive  model, rental rate (price net
of marginal-extraction  cost) is predicted  to rise at the rate of interest. The measure therefore
has a certain theoretical appeal.
On the other hand, the rate of price increase  also has a simple intuitive
decomposition. If we add extractior.  cost to the competitive  model, where cost can depend
on both current and cumulative  extraction, it can be shown that the rate of price change is
equal to a weighted  average of the return on capital and of the rate of change in
marginal-extraction  cost, MC:7
P  P-MC  MC b£C p=-  p  r+  p  MC  (10)
In other words, it is an average of a pure scarcity rent and a Ricardian or differential quality
rent.
The choice between the two measures, relative price and rental rate, ultimately  rests
on the nature of the scarcity; we can be concerned with the scarcity of "ore" (the unextracted
resource) or of "metal" (the refined commodity). If we think of ore as an input to processed
metal, it becomes  clear that changes in underlying economic  conditions can affect factor and
7  For a formal  demonstration,  see Smith  (1979).
6product prices differeiLtly. Moreover, the two indices do not always move in the same
direction.  In other words, qualitative  and quantitative  conclusions  drawn from the two
measures  can differ.  This would be of considerable  concern if each index were to give a
clear, but conflicting, signal.  However, as the next section demonstrates, this is not the
case.
2.  The Behavior  of Scarcity  Measures
The following  subsection  looks at the behavior of unit costs, relative prices, and
rental rates for selected non-renewable  resources. The models  assessed can be thought of as
reduced forms; the focus of analysis is on the time-series properties of either gross-scarcity
measures or the residuals obtained after conditioning  these measures  on exogenous  variables.
(More formal structural tests of the Hotelling model are considered in the next subsection.)
Here, the classic study is by Barnett and Morse (1963); in examining  both relative-price  and
unit-cost trends, they conclude that, because both fall over time, scarcity is not a problem.
In an update, Barnett (1979) reaches the same conclusion  -- that there is no sign of an upturn
in either the unit cost or relative price of major mineral commodities.
Barnett and Morse's  findings  are not universally  accepted. For example, Smith
(1979) looks at the stability of coefficients  of estimated  price-trend relationships  and argues
that the data are too volatile to support definitive  conclusions. Slade (1982) finds that, after
substantial  initial declines, the 1970s  show some evidence of an upturn in the price paths of
many minera  commodities. However, since then prices have been increasingly  volatile;
large run ups have been followed  by equally large declines (Slade 1991b), but there is little
evidence of a sustained  trend.
Rent is more difficult to measure directly.  However, Fisher (1979), and Devarajan
and Fisher (1982), argue that rent can be measured indirectly. They advocate the use of
unit-exploration  cost as a proxy for scarcity rent and find evidence that this cost has been
rising, at least for petroleum.
To summarize, if scarcity  is measured  by unit-extraction  cost, there is no evidence of
an increase.  If on the other hand, relative price or unit-exploration  cost is used as a scarcity
index, there is weak evidence of increased scarcity for some commodities. Nevertheless,
when we consider a century of data, the most striking feature is the decline in the relative
price of th. majority of mineral commodities. It is therefore of interest to examine the
simple competitive-market  model to see how it might be modified so as to produce prices
that fall over substantial  periods of time.  There are several such modifications.
First, in the simple model, the initial stock of the resource is known with certainty as
of time zero.  In practice, however, extraction of known  deposits  proceeds simulta-neously
with exploration for previously  unknown  ore bodies.  Indeed, large discoveries  increase the
size of the stock and can cmu¢e  prices to fall.  This issue is examined  by Pindyck  (1978).
Second, although the model outlined  in Section II allows for techiical change, the idea that
new methods  of extraction  can lower costs is not formally developed. The issue is explored
by Slade (19K.), who shows that prices can fall when cost-reducing  mining techniques  are
introduced. Third, substitute  materials  can cause the demand for mineral commodities  to
shift inwards.  Several authors (Heal, 1976; Hanson, 1980) have assessed the behavior  of
7resource prices and rental rates when a backstop technology  is introduced  and have shown
that both can fall in the presence of obsolescence.
The three modifications  outlined  above can produce falling prices without introducing
market failures of any sort, a subject  that is dealt with subsequently. In practice, the first
two -- discoveries  of previously  unknown  deposits  and new cost-lowering  extraction
techniques  -- are more likely than obsolescence  to contribute to falling prices.  Finally, it
should be noted that for all of the above explanations  of price decline, price-falling  phases
are apt to be temporary. 8 Ultimately, the exhaustibility  underlying Hotelling's model should
reassert itself.
3.  Structural Tests of the Hotelling Model
More formal tests of the Hotelling model are of two sorts.  The first relies on
estimates  of the extractive firm's productive  technology  combined with Euler equations  for
its dynamic-profit  maximization. Examples include Stollery (1983), Farrow (1985),
Halvorsen and Smith (1984 and 1991), and Young  (1991).  Once the firm's technology  is
known, rental rates can be approximated  either by: (1) the difference  between price and
marginal cost (Stollery, 1983; Farrow, 1985); or by (2) the shadow  price of the unpriced  ore
to the vertically integrated metal producer (Halvorsen  and Smith 1984 and 1991). Most such
tests have been conducted  using data for metal-mining  firms.  Although some studies support
the Hotelling model, its overall performance  has been poor.  In particular, rental rates for
some commodities  decline even faster than product prices.
Notice that this structural approach is able to deal with the shortcomings  of the
reduced-form  models.  In particular, technical change and demand shifts can be accounted
for.  And, as the data pertain to firms whose reserves are known  at the beginning  of the
estimation  period, new discoveries  cannot explain falling rental rates.
The second structural approach was developed  by Miller and Upton (1985), who base
their tests on a less widely known implication  of Hotelling's analysis of the optimal time
pattern for the exploitation  of an exhaustible  resource. They show that, for the
competitive-market  model, the value of the reserves in any currently operating, optimally
managed mineral deposit will depend solely on the current spot price, net of
marginal-extraction  cost and regardless  of when the reserves are extracted.  They refer to
this proposition  as the Hotelling Valuation  Principle. Miller and Upton test their model
using stock-market  valuations  of oil and gas reserves from a sample of U.S. companies  and
find the data to be consistent  with their Principle.  Unfortunately,  to tite author's knowledge,
there have been no subsequent  tests of the Hotelling Valuation Principle.
We can thus see that, with a few exceptions, their is little empirical support for the
predictions  of the Hotelling model. This can mean either that firms do not maximize  profits
or that the model is too simple to explain their observed  behavior.  The second explanation
seems more fruitful, and is explored  in the next section.
s The exception is the  discovery of a perfect  substitute that is cheaper to  produce than the
mineral commodity.
8V.  Trading  under Uncertainty
The model  of optimal extraction  of an exhaustible  resource developed  thus far has
several undesirable  features.  One such feature is the assumption  that the institutions  required
for trading exist and that all relevant information  is known to market participants  as of time
zero.  In other words, there are markets for each commodity  in every time period, and there
is no uncertainty.  hese assumptions  are now relaxed and the consequent  implications  for
prices and rental rates are explored.
1.  Introducing  Uncertainty
While the Hotelling model is completely  deterministic, the real world is inherently
uncertain. Uncertainty  in natural-resource  markets takes many forms including unknown
initial stocks of reserves (Gilbert 1979),  potential expropriation  of deposits (Long 1975),
stochastic  discoveries  of new supplies  (Loury 1978), and uncertain  timing of backstop
technology  availability  (Kamien  and Schwartz 1978). Each source of uncertainty  can affect
the behavior of prices and rental rates for natural-resource  commodities.
When uncertainty  is introduced, prices become  random variables; a deterministic
pattern, such as the r-percent rule, cannot be expected to hold.  At best, price can be
expected to rise at the rate of interest, which is the stochastic  analog of Hotelling's rule. 9
This notion can be made more precise.
Suppose that the rate of price appreciation is not deterministic, but instead a random
variable whose expectation  is r.  Thus:
dIPP = r +  et  (11)
where e is a random variable that is identically  and independently  distributed.  When (11)
holds, the discounted  price (i.e., the price that is constant in the Hotelling model)" 0 is said
to be a martingale. A characteristic  feature of a martingale  is that the optimal forecast for
any future value is the current value.
Deshmukh  and Pliska (1985)  develop a stochastic model of optimal-resource  depletion
under competitive-market  conditions  that includes all of the above-mentioned  sources of
uncertainty  as special cases.  They then ask when the discounted  price will be a martingale.
The answer is that discounted  prices are martingales  if, and only if, the conditional
distribution  of the timing of the uncertain event (the discovery  of a new deposit or
technology,  for example)  is independent  of the current stock of reserves S, or if the
occurrence of the event does not affect the profit function of the extractive firm.  Despite the
rather special conditions,  this answer may very well hold for many uncertain events of
9  For ease of exposition,  in what follows  the word "price"  is used instead of "price net of
marginal-extraction  cost."
tO  If Pt = PO  er, then discounted price, e'  Pt = PO,  is constant.
9interest.  For example, the timing of the discovery of additional  stocks, the development  of a
backstop technology, and political expropriation  of reserves are apt to be unaffected  by the
current level of reserves.  In addition, given that the Hotelling model performs poorly over a
wide range of discount rates, uncertainty  (which essentially modifies  the discount rate) is
unlikely to be the principal source of the problem.
2.  Incomplete  Markets
With the simplest Hotelling model, markets must exist for every commodity in every
time period.  Although this is in itself a formidable  requirement, the situation worsens still
further when uncertainty  is introduced. Markets have to exist for every time period and
every state of the world.  Since the number of potential states in a given time period is
unbounded, the dimensionality  of the problem also grows without bound.  We know from
Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) that a market for contingent  claims can be treated  just like
a market with no uncertainty. Identical  goods in different states of the world are assumed to
be different goods.  Therefore, if competitive  markets allocate resources in an efficient
manner under conditions of certainty, then, so long as markets are complete, the
competitive-market  allocation  of risk will also be Pareto optimal.
The efficiency of competitive  markets for contingent  claims is a powerful result.
Unfortunately,  it rests on the very strong assumption  of complete  markets.  Spot and futures
markets exist for many mineral commodities  such as copper and petroleum.  But it is not
possiblX  to purchase one futures contract for delivery of a commodity  three months forward
if the world is at war, and another contract for the same commodity  with the same due date
that differs only by the world being at peace.  Clearly, there are many more possible states
of the world than futures contracts.
The problem can be partly overcome by the introduction  of derivative financial  assets
such as options.  An option gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell
(or both) an agreed upon quantity of a commodity  at a fixed price on a specified  date in the
future.  Financial  economists  have expended considerable  effort in determining  the number of
securities such as options that are needed to complete  a market.  The option-pricing  model of
Black and Scholes (1973)  is a major contribution  to this literature. They show that the
ability to trade securities  frequently can enable a few multiperiod  securities to span many
states of nature.  In fact, their model contains only two securities, but an uncountable
number of states of the world.  Because trading is continuous  and uncertainty  resolved
smoothly, markets are effectively  complete.
Mineral-commodity  markets such as the London  Metal Exchange have existed for
more than a century.  More recently, new markets have opened  and new derivative securities
have been introduced." 1 Today, trading in commodity  futures and options is virtually
continuous and takes place at ah' hours of the day (albeit in different locations). Incomplete
"  For a description  of the new markets  and contracts,  see Slade,  Kolstad,  and Wiener (1991).
10markets may not therefore pose as large a problem as originally indicated.' 2
However, there remains another difficulty. The futures contracts currently traded are
at best for periods of thirty-six months forward.  The Hotelling model, in contrast, assumes
that one can trade forward into the indefinite  future.  There are two possible solutions to this
problem.  The first is to increase the maximum  length of the contracts traded, and initially
this may seem a good idea.  On closer inspection,  however, it has less appeal, given our
existence  in a second-best  world.  With respect to financial markets, the general theory of
second best translates into the principle that opening a new market can reduce welfare, as
long as the overall market remains incomplete."
The second possible way out is to substitute  a sequence  of short-term contracts for
one long-term contract; in other words, the short-term  contracts can be continuously  rolled
over.  Unfortunately, this solution  is also not ideal.  The theory of contracts tells us that if
there is a need for consumption  smoothing,  short and long-term contracts are not equivalent.
Mineral commodities  are storable and therefore inventories  can help to smooth consumption.
Nevertheless,  disruptions  in mineral markets, due to embargoes or political disruptions  for
example, can be lengthy.  This means that short-term  contracts might not lead to an optimal
allocation  of consumption  or of risk.
To summarize, the introduction  of uncertainty  leads to several difficulties  not
encompassed  by the simple Hotelling model.  Expected  prices may not increase at the rate of
interest, markets may be incomplete, and contract terms may be too short to allocate goods
and risk efficiently. In spite of all of these difficulties,  however, it is unlikely that
uncertainty  leads to a systematic  underpricing  of resource commodities. Moreover, the
resulting  complications  do not seem to be large in magnitude.
3.  Hotelling vs. Efficient-Market  Hypothesis
Many non-mineral  commodities  are also traded in futures markets.  Naturally, there
are many economic  theories that attempt to explain the price behavior of such commodities.
One of these, the efficient-market  hypothesis,  is examined  in this subsection.
When the market for a commodity  is efficient, "new" information  is instantly
incorporated  into the price level; if it were not, there would exist opportunities  for profitable
arbitrage.  By definition, "new" information  cannot be forecast and is therefore uncorrelated
with anything  known in previous periods.  This line of reasoning leads to the efficient-market
hypothesis,  which can be expressed formally  as
iPt/  =  et  (12)
12  The Black-Scholes  model relies on rather special assumptions  concerning  the nature of
uncertainty,  which  may not be met in practice. For this reason, many financial  economists  are
skeptical  that markets are in fact complete. Nevertheless,  my feeling  is that incompleteness  is not
central  to the problem  of concern  here.
13 This idea is developed  formally  by Hart (1975).
11where e is defined as for equation (11).  The EMF, as expressed in (12), states that percent
changes in prices are stochastic  and that undiscounted  prices are martingales." 4 This can be
contrasted  with (11), where discounted  prices are martingales, and with (7), where
undiscounted  prices increase  at a deterministic  rate and discounted prices are constant.
Equation (11) clearly nests all three possibilities. Moreover, it lends itself to
empirical testing.  In other words, it is possible  to discriminate  between the following  three
models: (1) a simple Hotelling model with the deterministic  rate of price appreciation  equal
to the rate of interest; (2) a stochastic Hotelling model with the expected value of price
appreciation  equal to the rate of interest; and (3) an efficient-market  model with the expected
value of price appreciation  equal to zero.
If we assume that e - N(0,o 2), then tests of the three possibilities  are as follows:
(1) r  >  0, o2 =  0, 2) r  >  0, o 2 > 0  and 3) r  =  0, o2 > 0.  Slade (1988) investigates  these
possibilities  using data on prices of seven major-mineral  commodities  over the period
1906-1973,  and finds that, although  none of the three models captures price behavior  exactly,
the third receives most support.  This means that the prices of natural-resource  commodities
behave very much like the prices of non-exhaustible  commodities  that are traded on futures
markets.
Figure 1 shows auto-orrelation functions  for price changes,  APt,  of the seven
commodities. In the figure, the solid lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Estimated  auto-correlation  coefficients  a, that lie outside the confidence  intervals (those
circled in the diagram) indicate violations of the predictions  of model three. 15 The figure
shows that the efficient-market  hypothesis  is only strongly rejected for petroleum, and it is
interesting  that a petroleum-futures  contract did not exist during the period of the data.  It is
also striking that the commodities  that have been traded on the London Metal Exchange since
the turn of the century, copper, lead, and silver, show no auto-correlations  significantly
different from zero.
To conclude, even though others have found evidence that mineral forward and
futures markets are not fully efficient ( Goss, 1981; Gilbert, 1986; and Jones and Uri,
1990),16  the behavior of prices for mineral  commodities  traded on exchanges is not
significantly  different from the behavior of renewable  commodity  or financial  asset prices.
VI.  Market Failures
The theoretical model developed  in Section II pertains to an ideal competitive  market.
l' Strictly speaking, it is the logarithm of price that is a martingale in (12).
t5  aj  iS  the correlation  coefficient  between  APt  and  APtj
16 Market inefficiency is not  unique to  mineral commodities.  It  is also often  rejected  for
renewable commodities and financial assets (see for example, Hodrick and Srivastava, 1987).
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In particular, firms are price takers in input and output markets, all factors are fully
employed, there are no constraints on profit-maximizing  behavior, property rights are well
defined, and extraction does not produce unwanted byproducts  such as pollution.  In the
absence of market failure, market and shadow prices (marginal  values) coincide.  Market
failure, however, can cause a divergence between market and marginal values.  In this
section, each of the above assumptions  is relaxed in turn, and the implications  for prices and
rental rates are explored.
1.  Output Market Distortions
Imperfect competition  in output markets occurs when firms face downward-sloping
demand schedules  for their products.  This is the case for both the monopolist  and
oligopolist; when a firm possesses  price power in output markets, the shadow price of output
is marginal revenue, not market price.  It is therefore marginal revenue that appreciates  at
the rate of interest, and equation (7) becomes
MR,/MR,  =  r  (13)
As price is above marginal revenue, monopoly  prices might be higher than
competitive  prices; but this need not be the case.  To understand why, consider a demand
function of constant-elasticity  j  (a positive number).  Marginal revenue and price are then
related thus:' 7
MRt  =  (1 - l4s)Pt  (14)
In other words, marginal revenue is a constant markdown  under price, which implies that
price and marginal revenue increase at the same rate.
17 Equation  (14) holds  for both monopolists  and oligopolists  as long  as A is the elasticity  of  firm
demand.
14Relationship  (14) holds for any firm with market power.  What differentiates
exhaustible-resource  markets, however, is the finite stock SO." 8 Since price must clear the
market, and the entire stock eventually be exhausted, monopoly  and competitive  price  paths
are identical  in the constant-elasticity  case.
This result, which is very strong, is derived using a range of simplifying (and perhaps
unreasonable)  assumptions. When some of these assumed conditions fail to hold, monopoly
and competitive  prices need not coincide.' 9 Nevertheless,  if a monopolist  charges higher
prices in early time periods, they will charge lower prices in later periods and vice versa.
The important point is that the finiteness  of the stock limits the scope for monopolists  to
exercise market power.
Moreover, when the conditions that lead monopoly  and competitive  price paths to
diverge are fulfilled, exhaustible-resource  markets are probably not characterized by
significant monopoly  power.  Most mineral commodities  are traded in world rather than
national markets, and in many of these markets levels of horizontal  concentration  have fallen
as a result of the entry of new extractive firms or the nationalization  of privately owned
reserves.  Monopoly power is therefore not an overriding consideration. 20
2.  Factor-Market  Distortions
In the standard analysis of exhaustible  resource markets, marginal cost plus scarcity
rent is taken to be a good measure of social value.  Due to factor-market  distortions, this is
less apt to be true in developing  countries.  In the presence of distortions, shadow and
market-input  prices differ and cause a divergence  between social and marginal cost.
Consider unemployment. In a fully employed competitive  economy, the social opportunity
cost of a worker is their market-wage  rate.  With unemployment,  however, the two diverge.
Particularly in less developed  countries, there are often systematic  forces that cause the
shadow price of labor to be less than the market wage. 2 "  When this is true,
marginal-extraction  cost exceeds social-extraction  cost.
Distortions also occur in capital markets.  Less developed  economies, in particular,
often operate under capital-market  constraints. Moreover, if a domestic  currency is
overvalued, the social opportunity  cost of imported capital will exceed its official financial
cost.  Given these distortions, marginal-extraction  cost underestimates  social-extraction  cost.
"  For expositional  purposes,  we assume  that the stock  is homogeneous  and that extraction  costs
are zero.
19 For a discussion  of the conditions  under which  a monopolist  will  extract  more or less  slowly
than firms  in a competitive  industry,  see Stiglitz  (1976).
0  This  conclusion may seem strange, in light of OPEC price increases in the  1970s. However,
we are concerned  here with  systematic  long-run  tendencies;  today  the crude-oil  market  is workably
competitive.
21  For a discussion  of these issues,  see Little and Mirrlees  (1974).
15Capital and labor-market distortions  tend to work in opposite directions, and their net
effect is therefore difficult to predict.  What is important, however, is that there is no
presumption  of a systematic  tendency for factor-market  distortions  to lead to the underpricing
of natural resources.
3.  Foreign Debt
In recent years, many resource-based  developing  countries have become heavily
indebted.  Overly optimistic  estimates  of future petroleum  revenues have been one cause for
excessive  borrowing, but there are others.  It has been suggested that heavily indebted
countries are forced to over-expand  their resource exports in an effort to obtain foreign
exchange.
There are several explanations  for this alleged  behavior.  The most important is the
constraint imposed by debt-servicing  when borrowing capacity has been exhausted. When
resource prices fall, a higher level of exports is needed to keep foreign-exchange  earnings
constant.  Under these circumstances, the supply schedule  for natural-resource  commodities
will be downward-sloping  or at least backward-bending. This behavior will in turn depress
commodity  prices, thus continuing  the cycle.  The situation  can be exacerbated  if a
combination  of high debt levels and the desire to make exports competitive  leads developing
countries to depreciate their currencies. Under these circumstances, shadow  prices of foreign
exchange differ from official exchange rates and shadow-commodity  prices differ from
commodity-market  prices.
The evidence for such a hypothesis  is mixed.  Gilbert (1986) finds a negative
correlation between developing-country  debt levels and non-fuel  primary-commodity  prices.
His work, however, is criticized  by Chang (1987)  for relating changes in commodity prices
to levels of debt service; high debt-servicing  should imply low, not falling commodity  prices.
Chang reformulates  the specification  and finds no evidence  of either an outward shift in the
supply schedule  for primary commodities  or a change in its slope.  He concludes  that there is
no reason to believe that developing  country debt can account for either low or falling
commodity  prices.  Thus, although  the debt-servicing  hypothesis  for underpricing
natural-resources  has a certain theoretical  appeal, the evidence in its favor is not strong.
Until further investigation  yields more consistent  results, the issue must remain unresolved.
A second possible link works indirectly, through the interest rate.  Suppose  that
interest rates rise, and that their increase is expected  to be permanent.  Debt payments will
clearly rise by the same fraction, while mineral  commodity  prices wiU  rise at the higher rate
(equation  7).  However, higher commodity-price  appreciation  -- implying lower consumption
in all future periods -- is incompatible  with equation (5) unless  a downward  jump in price
occurs first.  In othtr words, the initial response  to higher interest rates is deflationary.
VII.  Common Property and Environmental  Externalities
Common-property  resources present special problems  for the definition  and
enforcement  of property rights.  Their key feature is the large number of users, each of
16whom ignore the effect that their use has on others.  Consider  one common property
resource bad, namely the pollution associated  with the extraction of an exhaustible
resource.'  Suppose  that there are N identical  producers -- countries or firms -- who
manufacture  a homogeneous  output, q, using the services  of capital, k, and a
common-property  resource, P.3  This can be summarized  by the production function
q; = h(kl,P)  Ei q, = Q  i = 1  ... N  (15)
where capital letters stand for aggregate quantities. Moreover, pollution P is produced  as a
byproduct of the produc.tion  of q, a relationship  assumed  to be linear.  Thus:
pi  = n  q 1 pi  Pi = P  (16)
Note that it is aggregate  pollution P that enters into the production relationship  (15).
Under well known regularity  conditions, there exists a total-cost function C that is
dual to the production function h.  C has as arguments the rental price of capital, r, the level
of pollution (which is unpriced), and the quantity  of output produced, q 1.
Each producer seeks to maximize  their private profit, vi:
max ir  = qi - C(r,P,q;)  (17)
subject to the constraint (16).  Without loss of generality, output price is chosen to equal 1.
In what follows, the subscript i is suppressed;  this is justified because all producers are
assumed identical. For a non-cooperative  solution  or Nash equilibrium, the first-order
condition for the maximization  of (17) is:
5i/bq  = 1 - Cp  B - Cq = 0  (18)
or
Cp =  (I - C)/B  (19)
Now suppose  that a cooperative  solution is sought.  In other words, a single agent or
planner acts to maximize  joint profit, Ir  =  :i  x,.  Thus:
2  In fact, mineral commodities  are responsible  for a large fraction of the pollution that is
generated  today. Jorgenson  and  Wilcoxen  (1990)  find  that three sectors  -primary  metals,  petroleum
refining,  and chemicals  - account  for 55% of US spending  on pollution  abatement.
'  This model  is taken from Slade  (1987). That paper, in turn, makes  use of Baumol  and Oates
(1975)  and Dasgupta  (1982).
17max 7X  =  E, [q - C(r,P,q,)],  (20)
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subject to the N constraints (16).  Since each producer is identical, (20) is equivalent to
max X7  =  Q - NC(r,P,q)  q =  Q/N  (21)
Q
The first-order  condition for this maximization  is:
I - N[Cp  B  +  Cq/Nl = 0  (22)
or
Cp  (1 - Cq)/NB  (23)
The difference  between (19) and (23) is obvious. The planner takes into account the
fall in every producer's output due to an increase in producer i's polluting activities, and i's
output is therefore increased only up to the point at which the private marginal cost of
polluting is equal to the private-marginal  value of pollution divided by N -- in other words,
when social-marginal  costs and benefits are equated.'
In the case of a noncooperative  or market solution, Pareto optimality  is not achieved.
Too much pollution is produced  and everyone could be made better off through cooperation.
When N is large, this difference  can be substantial. Market failure is caused by the lack of a
market for pollution: pollution is both unpriced and commonly  owned.  The latter feature is
crucial.  To see this, consider the case where P is a private good, so that only pi enters ir*.
In this circumstance, even though pollution has no market price, it does have a shadow price,
CP, that gives the correct signals.  In contrast, where P is a common-property  resource, the
private-shadow value,  (1 - Cq)/B, does not equal the social-shadow value,  (1 - CQ)/NB,  and
market failure ensues.  Here, there is a definite case for public intervention. The marginal
social damage  of pollution is NCp. If the government  charged each firm a tax, T, per unit of
pollution generated, equal to the difference between the social and private damage,
T  = NCp  - Cp  =  (N - l)Cp, then optimality  would be achieved.  In other words, each firm
would set private-marginal  benefit, (1 - Cg)/B,  equal to private marginal cost,
Cp +  (1 - N)Cp,  which yields the cooperative  condition (23).
To summarize, we have seen that common-property  environmental  resources are
sources of potentially  serious market failure.  Avoiding  the latter requires intervention  or
some form of cooperative  behavior.  When the common-property  resource is a bad
(pollution), it is underpriced (at zero) and overproduced. Moreover, the output produced  in
this polluting manner is also underpriced  and overproduced.
24  Equations  (19) and (23) are special  cases  of a result due to Samuelson  (1954).
18Our concern here is with exhaustible  resources, whose production and use is closely
associated  with various pollutant byproducts. The combustion  of fossil fuels, for example,
generates carbon dioxide and contributes  to global warming; metal-smelting  is associated
with acid rain; and strip mining results in unsightly  surface damage.  Often the market price
of an exhaustible resource does not reflect its true social production cost.  The obvious
remedy is to tax either the producer or the consumer.25  However, given that environmental
spillovers  are transnational, setting  appropriate taxes or standards requires international
cooperation, and unfortunately, international  agencies have no legal power to enforce
cooperative  agreements. For this reason, if an agreement is to be effective, it must be self-
enforcing.  The design of environmental  taxes and their incidence  is a broad subject that
cannot be covered here.  Nevertheless,  since environmental  damage can be irreversible, this
is a problem that deserves immediate  attention.
Vm.  Summary and  Conclusions
The efficiency  and equity of a market allocation  of exhaustible  resources has been
examined  and the behavior of scarcity measures, such as relative price and rental rates, has
been assessed. Little evidence of scarcity  or impending  shortage has been uncovered.
Indeed, the evidence  points to falling prices and rents for many commodities. This raises the
important  question of whether markets are providing  the wrong signals. Are resource
commodities  systematically  underpriced? The conclusions  of this study are not completely
optimistic. Many market failures have been revealed in the analysis, any of which could
result in inappropriate  resource commodity  pricing.  But, with one exception, no systematic
tendency to underprice has been found. The exception  concerns the environmental
externalities  associated  with the production  and use of natural-resource  commodities. Similar
externalities  lead to underpricing  and overuse of all commodities. Mineral commodities,
however, are responsible for a large fraction of the pollution that is currently generated, and
therefore their underpricing  is particularly significant.
The market failures associated with common-property  and environmental  resources
can cause market prices to be lower than shadow  prices or marginal values.  They cannot,
however, cause relative-resource  prices to fall.  Falling prices would be associated  with a
relaxation  of environmental  standards and a move away from full-social-cost  pricing.  The
tendency, however, is towards increased awareness  of environmental  damage  and increased
willingness to pay for its associated  costs.  Nevertheless, the prices of many natural-resource
commodities  have fallen in real terms.  Factors causing prices to decrease are not associated
with market failure, and therefore do not argue for interference  with the market mechanism.
Indeed, innovations  that lower mining and processing  costs, discoveries  that increase
resource stocks, and the provision of lower-cost substitutes  are all features of efficiently
operating markets.
M  The magnitude  and incidence  of such  taxes  are examined  in Slade (1991a). On average,  they
are found  to be progressive.  If this finding  is  robust,  then it helps  to mitigate  the problems  associated
with  environmental  preservation.
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23Annex:  Derivation  of Equation (6)*
Consider an economy where aggregate output, Q, is produced by two
inputs, man-made capital, K, and an exhaustible resource, R.  This
relationship is governed by the production function
Qt = f(Kt, Rt, t).  (Al)
f is assumed to be increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable
in K and R, and the marginal products of K and R are assumed to be strictly
positive.  Finally, it is assumed that
lim  fK =  rim  fR  (A2)
K-+O  R-*0
Output can be consumed (C) or invested (I) so that
Qt = Ct + It  (A3)
and
It = dKt/dt  =: kt-  (A4)
The economy is endowed  with an initial stock of the exhaustible resource, So.
At any time t, therefore, the stock remaining is
St = So - ft  Rds,  (A5)
so that  §t = - Rt and  St a 0.
We restrict attention to programs where Kt, Rt, and Ct are strictly
positive for all t and partition time into discrete intervals of length D.  Let
CtD, RtD, and ItD represent  consumption, resource utilization, and
investment during  the interval (t, t+D) and consider two adjacent intervals (t,
t+D) and (t+D, t+2D). Fixing the program everywhere except on these two
* A similar model can be found in Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
24intervals, we would like to see if we can have a higher level of consumption
on the first without reducing consumption on the second.
On the two intervals, we have
CtD + ItD = f(Kt, Rt, t)D
and  (A6)
Ct+DD + It+DD = f(Kt+D,  Rt+D,t+D)D.
Conducting a variation on the first equation in (A6) yields
ACt + AIt = fKt AKt + fRt  ARt = ° + fRt  ARt,  (A7)
and conducting a variation on the second equation in (A6) yields
ACt+D +AIt+D = 0 +AIt+D = fKt+D AKt+D + fRt+D ARt+D-*  (AS)
Since both K and S are held fixed at t and at t+2D,  it must be true that AIt +
AIt+D  = ARt+  ARt+D  = 0.  This fact, together with (A7)  and (AS)  yields
ACt = (YRt  - fRt+D)ARt  + fKt+D  AKt+D-  (A9)
Along an efficient program, variation can yield no extra consumption in the
interval (t, t+D), which implies that ACt  = 0.  And, as Kt is fixed, DAIt  = AKt+D-
Substituting these facts and equation (A7) into (A9),  we obtain
fKt+D  = (fRt+D  - fRt)/(DfRt).  (A10)
*  Readers unfamiliar with the calculus of variations are referred to Kamien and
Schwartz (1981).
''  A&Kt  = 0 because there was no change in investment  in the previous period, and
ACt+D  = Oby  assumption.
25Equation (AO) must be satisfied for every adjacent pair of intervals along an
efficient program.  If we take the limit as D --  0, (A10)  becomes
fKt = ?Rt/fRt.  (All)
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